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IMMUNITY OF TRADE UNIONS FOR INDUCING
BREACH OF CONTRACT: A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION IN INDIA
KUNAL AMBASTA

INTRODUCTION
Trade union activity, by its definition, involves unionism and the
exercise of collective bargaining power. The collective action of trade
unions and their members has been expressed in different ways from
peaceful bargaining and picketing to strikes and lockouts. At several
instances, trade union activity would include the threat or forewarning of
strikes in order to have demands met at the outset itself. The question that
arises would be to what extent is an act of a trade union for the furtherance
of its objectives valid. Trade union activity includes industrial action such
as the threat to break contracts and to stop work contractually undertaken,
to disallow others from performing contractual duties and to threaten to do
the same.
The development of the legal immunity to be accorded to a trade union
for acts such as the ones stated above is long and inconstant. It has been
subject to successive legislative modification and innovative and restrictive
judicial interpretation. The history of the evolution is aligned with the
evolution of the trade union movement in Britain. It was adopted in India
only after a great degree of finality had been achieved in the position. The
legal position depends also on principles of contract, such as privity and the
law of torts.
There has been some development in the latter half of the twentieth
century as well in this regard. Indian case law development regarding
immunity of trade unions has been sparse even after the Trade Unions Act,
19261was enacted. The present paper aims to analyze the development of
the immunity of trade unions from civil liability for inducement of breach
of contracts that has been statutorily provided. The principles of the law of
tort and contract that have been developed in this area are examined in the
paper. The changing scope of the immunity and the relevant case law is
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sought to be analysed. The paper aims to study the present position of the
immunity granted in India and in England.
INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CIVIL
CONSPIRACY
The provision of immunity to trade unions and members thereof from
civil action for certain activities succeeded the immunity granted in this
regard firstly under criminal law. During much of the nineteenth century in
England, it was a crime to breach a contract for service.2 When the
inducement for breach of contract was removed from the list of criminal
offences, several exceptions were made to the immunity. Therefore, if there
was use of coercion, intimidation, molestation or obstruction, the act would
still be criminal.3 These terms were vague and freely interpreted by the
Courts to the disadvantage of trade unions until the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 1871 was enacted, which restricted their interpretation.4
With the protection under criminal law gradually being established, the
Courts took recourse to imposing civil liability on trade unions. The
decision in the case of Lumley v. Gye5 crystallised an action for maliciously
inducing or procuring a breach in contract between two parties by a third
party. In the case, the defendant had procured a breach of contract between
the plaintiff, who owned a theater, and an opera performer who was bound
under contract to perform for the plaintiff exclusively. The breach of
contract was found to have been induced with a view to injure the plaintiff
and actionable.6Interpreting this in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.,7Lord Hoffman
held that the test would be twofold. The tort would cover acts done which
were intended to cause loss to the plaintiff and were per se unlawful against
the third party as well.8The dissenting opinion expressed in the same
judgment held that action could be found only on contract between the two
parties to the same and not with regard to the third party. The third party’s
2
Master and Servant Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. (Eng.)(prohibiting breaches of
contracts of service in certain industries as criminal offences). This law were repealed
by the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86, § 17
(Eng.).
3
The Molestation of Workmen Act, 1859, 22 Vict. (Eng.).
4
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 32, § 1 (Eng.).
5
(1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) (Eng.). For a critique on the principle laid down in
the Lumley case, see David Howarth, Against Lumley v Gye, 68 MOD. L.
REV.,195(2005) (arguing that the tortious remedy can be precluded by the remedy in
contract law).
6
Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 769.
7
[2007] 1 A.C. (H.L.).
8
Id. For a detailed study of the difference of opinions between the Bench in the case,
see Janet O’Sullivan, Intentional Economic Torts, Commercial Transactions and
Professional Liability, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, 170, (2008).
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liability could arise only in the case of labour disputes which required a
master-servant relationship, a condition that did not exist in the first place.9
The evolution did not occur smoothly as in the case of Allen v. Flood,10
where the House of Lords held that the malicious nature of the defendant’s
action in procuring a breach of contract was of no account if the means and
acts committed were lawful. The intention to harm someone does not result
in a tort unless some additional element of illegality is also present.
With the decision of the Lumley case, inducing breach of contract
became actionable in tort. However, the same is not the position of law
presently. If the acts committed are legal in themselves and if they do not
amount to conspiracy, they are not actionable as interference in existing
contractual relationships. The decision in the case of D.C. Thomson & Co.
Ltd.v. Deakin,11 held that even when a third party knowingly acts in a way
to render the performance of a contract impossible, he would incur no
liability as long as his acts were legal. The legal position on inducing
breaches of contracts has evolved because of a large number of judicial
pronouncements that ruled on its ingredients, scope and defences.
Certain ingredients are required for liability for inducing breach of
contract to arise. These have been laid down in decisions of Courts in
Britain. Firstly, the liability for inducing a breach of contract arises only
upon the actual breach of the contract in question. There does not exist a
single, objective test for the determination of whether there has been a
breach or not. The terms and conditions of the contract and the act alleged
to constitute the breach would have to be examined, and would be the
guiding factor in determining the existence of a breach. If the workers
refuse to fulfil obligations undertaken by them at the time of employment,
breach can be inferred.12 When a certain practice is implied in the contract
9

Id. at 246.
Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C.1 (H.L.) (Eng.). The defendant, Allen, was an officer of
a union of ironworkers. The plaintiff workmen were employed as woodworkers. The
ironworkers objected as they had been employed for woodwork and had now been
made ironworkers. Allen demanded that work would be stopped unless all
woodworkers were dismissed. The plaintiffs were dismissed lawfully and were not reemployed later. It was held by the Court of first instance, as well as the Court of
Appeal, that the defendant was liable for having maliciously procured the termination
of the plaintiffs. The House of Lords held that the element of malicious motive was
inconsequential and that the means used by the defendant were lawful and that the acts
committed by them were also lawful. However, there is a recognised exception to the
principle laid down in the present case; the tort of conspiracy to injure. See SIMON
DEAKIN & GILLIAN S. MORRIS, LABOUR LAW,1040 (4th ed..2012).
11
D.C. Thompson & Co. v Deakin, [1952] Ch. 646 at 647 (Eng.).
12
J.T. Stratford & Son, Ltd. v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269 at 338 (Eng.). In the present
case, dock workers refused to handle certain goods that were labeled by them as
“black” and belonged to certain persons. It was held that the terms and conditions of
the contract between the workers and the employers would be of relevance, and if the
worker had undertaken to carry out certain acts, he could not later refuse to do the same
under the original contract. However, the worker was free to agree upon new terms and
conditions under the same contract through negotiation.
10
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and has been the followed custom, nonperformance can be deemed to be a
breach of contract notwithstanding the fact that the same has not been
expressly made a condition.13 The requirement of actual breach is unclear
as the House of Lords held that an action would lie when a third party
conspired to cause breach by deliberately and directly interfering with the
execution of a contract.14
The second condition that needed to be satisfied for an action in tort to
lie was that of interference with the subsisting contract, the breach of which
was procured. Interference may be directly on the person breaking the
contract or by indirect means rendering the fulfilment of the contract
impossible.15 The nature of the interference has been a varyingly
understood term with the condition laid down that the defendant must know
that there exists a subsisting contract and that the inducement would lead to
breach if successful.16 The knowledge to fulfil this condition can be implied
even when the defendant did not have specific knowledge of the terms of
the contract. The custom followed in the trade or profession may be
deemed to be commonly known and therefore, inducing a breach of such a
duty could amount to a breach of contract.17
Third, the intention to procure a breach of contract is an important
ingredient of the tort. It is important that the breach was foreseen and
intended by the defendant. It must be proven that the interference was to
procure the commission of an unlawful act. If the interference was to
encourage an aim that could be lawfully reached, there is no tort committed
even if illegalities were committed.18 It must also be shown that an injury is
received due to the breach. Specific damages are not required and inference
would be sufficient.19
The Courts have also resorted to another tort apart from that of inducing
breach in a subsisting contract. This is the tort of civil conspiracy. The
13

Id.
Emerald Construction Co. v. Lowthian, [1966] A.C. 691 at 700-701 (Eng.). In the
present case, the trade union advocated for the removal of the subcontracting
agreement, which was an agreement for the supply of “labour only”. The union
demanded that the labour be directly employed and not subcontracted. When the
demand was not met, the union resorted to a variety of industrial action that had the
effect of slowing down the work considerably. An interlocutory injunction was granted
on appeal due to the fact that the “labour only” agreement was not a term of
employment and was not protected under the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. Lord Denning
held, “The words ‘contract of employment’ in this context seem to me prima facie to
denote a contract between an employer and workman; and not a contract between an
employer and a subcontractor, even though he be a subcontractor for labour only.” Id.
at 701.
15
M.A. HICKLING, CITRINE’S TRADE UNION LAW, 68 (3d ed. 1967).
16
D.C. Thompson & Co., Ch. at 682.
17
Id. at 686-87 (Lord Evershed M.R.)
18
Hickling, supra note 15, at 73.
19
Id. at 74.
14
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development of the tort and its application has been seen as the judiciary’s
attempt to undermine the statutory protection granted to a growing trade
union movement. Professor Jenks stated that the decisions of the Courts in
the Quinn v. Leathem20 and the Taff Vale21decisions amounted to creating a
new form of civil liability and then creating a new defendant being alleged
for the same.22 As one moves from the decisions of the Courts on this
aspect, different nuances of this tort can be seen to emerge. In the case of
Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,23 an arrangement to
exclude competition was held to be lawful, and as the objects of the same
were the promotion of business, the plaintiffs had no cause for damages.
In the decision in Leathem’s case, the Court found that the object of the
unionist action was to cause injury to the plaintiff and not to promote their
own interests. An action on conspiracy to injure was found. Though the
individuals were not singly liable as they had not committed a tort, the
combination was held to have committed it. Lord Macnaghten stated, “...a
violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action.”24 The
Taff Vale decision was of much importance because it conferred a
corporate personality on the trade union itself which could in turn expose
the union to any form of civil action and the assets of the trade union were
therefore exposed to be utilised for payment of damages. According to
Citrine, the decision was a “smashing blow” to trade union activity in
England.25
20
[1901] A.C. 495 (Eng.). The plaintiff had employed certain workmen who did not
belong to the defendant’s trade union. In order to procure the dismissal of these
workers, the union threatened the plaintiff’s customer that it would withdraw union
labour unless he stopped dealing with the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s offer to procure
membership for the workers was refused by the trade union. See also, HENRY PELLING,
A HISTORY OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM,121 (3d ed., 1984).
21
The Taft Vale Ry. Co. v The Amalgamated Soc’y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426
(Eng.). In the present case, a strike had arisen, and the union was indulging in picketing
as well as persuasion of “blacklegs”. An injunction was sought and granted against the
besetting and watching of the premises of the plaintiff company for the purposes of
persuading the blacklegs or other interested workers to strike.
22
K.W. Wedderburn, Intimidation and the Right to Strike, 27MOD. L. REV.,257
(1964).
23
[1892] A.C. 25 (Eng.). The defendants had formed an association of ship owners
and had formed schemes to offer rebates with a view to establish a monopoly of the
business. The rebates and other schemes would be offered to agents and workmen only
if they exclusively handled the defendant’s business. The House of Lords unanimously
held that the defendants had acted with the object of promoting their own interests in a
lawful way and no liability could be established.
24
Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. at 510.
25
Hickling, supra note 15, at 16. The “seeds of confusion” regarding the tort were
sown in the decision of Quinn’s case. It is argued that the facts of the case were similar
to those of Allen v. Flood with the difference that they included the act of a conspiracy
done through lawful means. This allowed the Court to develop this tort which had as its
unique feature the peculiarity that an act which was lawful in one became unlawful by
many. Hazel Carty, The Economic Torts in the 21st Century, 124 L.Q.REV.641, 644
(2008).
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The test of the purpose of the action was applied by the House of Lords
in the decision of Sorrell v. Smith26 to determine whether the tort of civil
conspiracy had been committed. In that case, the plaintiff had transferred
his business to a firm named Watsons at the instruction of a union of retail
newsagents. The defendants threatened to cut the supply of materials to
Watsons unless it stopped dealing with the plaintiff. As a result, Watsons
complied and the plaintiffs sued. The Trial Court held that though there
was no intention to injure the plaintiff, damages had resulted and they were
actionable because they had been procured by threats. This was set aside
upon appeal and it was held that the purpose of the defendants was lawful
and the means adopted were also legal. This represents a two step test
where the real purpose of the action of the union was sought to be
determined and then the question of whether the means were lawful was
answered.
The same test of lawful means and the prominent purpose of the action
was applied in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch.27 In the
present case, the officials of a trade union and the spinning operatives of
the Island of Lewis formed a caucus against certain other local producers of
tweed cloth. They were able to sell the goods at a cheaper rate than the mill
owners of the island. Due to this, the mill owners could not employ the
entire members of the trade unions of dock workers and they refused to
handle their goods. On an action for injunction and damages, it was held
that the purpose of the union was predominantly to further their interests
and not to injure and therefore, the action was refused.

LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION AND JUDICIAL INNOVATION
IN THE UK
The development of the law as has been described in the last chapter was
not smooth or without friction. Often, in deciding important questions and
evolving newer forms of liability, the Courts were working around
statutorily granted protections to trade unions meant to enable them to carry
out their activities successfully and effectively. It is easily discernible that
the movement of the Parliament was towards evolving a broader and
comprehensive set of protections towards workmen which was frustrated
by judicial workings and evolution of newer forms of liability such as

26

[1925] A.C. 700 (Eng.). Lord Dunedin rejected the suggestion that the what was
lawful if done by a person could become illegal if done by many if done with a view to
injure and described the same view that was adopted in Quinn v. Leathemas “the
leading heresy”.
27
[1942] A.C. 435 (Eng.).
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“obstruction”, “molestation and “intimidation”.28
The development of the law of immunity of trade unions from civil
actions have reached a mature stage with the enactment of the Trade
Disputes Act, 1906 which granted the bodies and their members as well as
office bearers certain immunity.29 Substantially similar provisions are
provided in the Indian legislation, The Trade Unions Act, 1926.30 Just prior
to the enactment of the British Act of 1906, there had been significant
development in the area of trade union immunity. The Courts had
developed the doctrines of civil conspiracy and inducement of breach of
contract. According to Wedderburn, the same was a direct response to the
curtailment of other avenues of civil action such as obstruction etc. by the
legislation of 1875.31 The result was that by these doctrines, the Courts
could meaningfully dispense with the immunity of trade union activities. It
was to undo this innovative judicial interpretation that the Act of 1906 was
passed.32
Section 3 of the Act of 1906 granted immunity against civil action. The
corresponding provision in Indian law is Section 18 of the Trade Unions
Act, 1926. Both the provisions bear considerable similarity and require the
fulfilment of certain conditions before the immunity can be granted. Firstly,
under the English law, any person who may commit an act in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute would be protected in
respect of that act only on the ground that the act induced a breach of
contract of employment and certain other forms of liability that are
specifically mentioned. The Indian law is identical as far as the forms of
liability protected against are concerned. However, the scope of the Indian
provision mentions specifically that the immunity would be available to the
trade union, a member or an office bearer thereof in respect of an act done
in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to which a member of the
trade union is party.
Under both the Indian and the English laws, an important requirement
was that the protection was limited by use of the term “on the ground
only”. This implies that if there are other grounds for the institution of a
civil suit apart from the one mentioned in the provision, a civil suit would
lie. The interpretation of the term was in question in the celebrated case of
28
W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORTS896 (18th ed.2010). The
author notes that the legislative reform was precipitated by judgments of the Court and
to curtail the scope of the Common Law with regard to trade disputes. The Trade
Disputes Act of 1906 is said to have been necessitated by the Taff Vale decision.
29
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, §§ 1, 3.
30
The Trade Unions Act, No. 16 of 1926, INDIA CODE (2000), vol. 20, §§ 17-18.
31
Wedderburn, supra note 22, at 258. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86.
32
Hickling, supra note 15, at 17 (citing Sir John Simon (1906) Parl. Deb. (4th Ser.)
890).
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Rookes v. Barnard33 where the House of Lords held that threats to break a
contract could amount to “intimidation” and in that case, a tort of
intimidation would have been committed.34 Lord Reid stated that the threat
to breach a contract may be a greater coercive weapon than the threat to
commit a tort.35 Lord Devlin concurred stating that the essence of the tort
here was the element of coercion.36
Therefore, it was held that the protection granted by Section 3 of the Act
of 1906 was to be interpreted strictly and restrictively. It was a protection
against inducement of breach of contract and not against the tort of
intimidation. In the present case, the dismissal of the plaintiff was due to
the threat to go on strike otherwise. The decision has evoked criticism as
one which disregards the evolution of the law of trade union immunity. It
has been argued that the recognition of damage to a person out of a
threatened breach of contract is against the well settled principle of privity
of contract and had been heretofore unrecognised in English law.37
The decision can also be critiqued from the standpoint of the evolution
of the trade union immunity and the purpose of the statutory provision. To
propose such a narrow construction on the immunity against inducement to
breach a contract renders the protection redundant. The effect of the
decision can be put as an instruction to trade unions that they would be
tortiously liable if they declare their intent to strike for non-fulfilment of
demands that would very well fall within the definition of “trade disputes”.
In the present case, the facts were that a “no strike” agreement was
interpreted to be an implied term of the contract of service and therefore the
threat to strike was a threat to breach the contract of employment. This
would mean that any prior notice of strike can be held to be a tort if such a
term is implied in the contract of service at a later stage.
The decision of the House of Lords had the practical effect of
undermining the legislative development due to the Trade Disputes Act,
33
34

[1964] A.C. 1129 (Eng.).
Id.

35
Id.at 1167(Lord Reid)(“It has often been stated that if people combine to do
acts which they know will cause loss to the plaintiff, he can sue if either the object
of their conspiracy is unlawful or they use unlawful means to achieve it. In my
judgment, to cause such loss by threat to commit a tort against a third person if he
does not comply with their demands is to use unlawful means to achieve their
object.”).
36
Id.at 1209 (Lord Devlin) (“I find therefore nothing to differentiate a threat of a
breach of contract from a threat of physical violence or any other illegal threat. The
nature of the threat is immaterial, because... its nature is irrelevant to the plaintiff's
cause of action. All that matters to the plaintiff is that, metaphorically speaking, a club
has been used. It does not matter to the plaintiff what the club is made of—whether it is
a physical club or an economic club, a tortious club or an otherwise illegal club. If an
intermediate party is improperly coerced, it does not matter to the plaintiff how he is
coerced.”).
37
Wedderburn, supra note 22, at 591.

338

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3.2

1906 by introducing a new and broad form of liability. It has been
understood to be the most important decision after the enactment of that
Act,38 and was also the reason for the new enactment in 1965.39 The Act’s
statement of Objects and Reasons states that it is meant to prevent actions
found on tort in respect of acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute.40 Section 1 of the Act clearly specified that acts consisting of
threats to break a contract of employment or inducement of the same would
not be actionable.41 Thereby, the Parliament undid the decision of
Rookes’case and restored the immunity of the trade unions once again.

THE INDIAN POSITION ON IMMUNITY OF TRADE UNIONS
We must consider the Indian evolution of the immunity granted to trade
unions. As has been noted, the forms of action from which protection is
granted under Section 18 of the Indian law are identical with those under
the English law. In Indian case law on the point, the issue that has been
most often in question is the scope of the immunity with regard to the acts
they cover. The term “on the ground only” present in the provision has
been the subject matter of interpretation. In the case of Dalmia Cements
Ltd. v. Naraindas Anandji Bechar,42it was held that the immunity was to be
restricted and the commission of trespass would not be protected. The
words “on the ground only” were deemed to be of essential importance.
In the case of Punjab National Bank v. A.I.P.N.B.E. Federation,43the
facts related to a pen-down strike where the employees also refused to
vacate their seats in the office when called upon to do so. Justice
Gajendragadkar held that though the pen down strike was a valid and
protected action of the trade union, the workers would have no right to stay
on the office premises after office hours and such act could amount to an
actionable wrong. In the decision of the Calcutta High Court on the case of
Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. State of West Bengal,44 it was held that the
protection under Sections 17 and 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1906
extended only to acts that were peaceful and did not amount to molestation
or intimidation. In that case, the facts pertained to the “gherao” (siege or
38

Id. at 572.
Trade Disputes Act, 1965, c. 48 (Eng.).
40
Id. at Statement of Objects and Reasons(“An Act to prevent actions founded on
tort, or of reparation, being brought in respect of certain acts done in contemplation or
furtherance of trade disputes.”).
41
Id. at § 1.
42
Dalmia Cement Ltd. v. Naraindas Anandji Bechar, (1939) A.I.R. Sindh 256 (Ind.).
43
A.I.R.1960 S.C. 160(Ind.).
44
Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1968 Cal. 407 (1967)
(Ind.).
39
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blockade) of industrial premises leading to the confinement of several
persons. The High Court held that such acts would amount to wrongful
confinement and would not be protected under the Act.45
It is interesting to note, however, that the Calcutta High Court approves
of the decision in Rookes v. Barnard.46Therefore, it would not be incorrect
to state that the restriction placed on trade union immunity by that case,
which was again reversed by the Act of 1965 has been lifted into Indian
law by this judgment and the immunity granted is thereby restricted in
India as well. This particular development is not favourable since the
Rookes ratio was itself an aberration of the 1906 Act and has been reversed
by legislative action.
The Calcutta High Court had approved of the Rookes decision when
there was no need for it to do so. The tort of intimidation as was applied by
the House of Lords itself had been much criticised. To follow the same line
when the tort of intimidation has not been developed in India and to restrict
the immunity and to follow the ratio in Rookes’ case which had been
affected by the long line of conflicting English decisions. The same history
has not been repeated in India and the statutory protection is clear. It is
surprising to note that the High Court had not taken note of the Trade
Disputes Act of 1965 while holding that the Indian and English laws were
similarly restricted.
The restrictions on the scope of activities that can be covered under
Section 18 have been placed by several decisions of the Courts. In India,
the theoretical development of the law of torts has not occurred side by side
with these judgments and the Courts have largely confined themselves to
pronouncing strictures that must be followed. It has been held that the
means which are adopted by a trade union in furtherance of its cause in a
trade dispute must be legal per se and not tortious or unlawful.47
In the case of Rohtas Industries Staff Union v. State of Bihar,48 the
workers had gone on an illegal and unjustified strike at the instance of the
union. The matter came for arbitration where it was held that the workers
participating in the strike would be jointly and severally liable for damage
caused. The Patna High Court, on a writ petition, quashed the order of the
arbitrator. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court and
held that a claim for compensation by the employers would also not fall
under the definition of a “trade dispute” under Section 24 of the Industrial

45

Id.
Id. at 30-31.
47
Reserve Bank of India v. Ashis,(1969) 73 CWN 388 (Ind.);see also Sri Ram Vilas
Service Ltd. v. Simpson and Group Company Union, (1979) 2 L.L.J. 284
(Madras)(Ind.);G.B. PAI, LABOUR LAW IN INDIA VOLUME I,459-60 (2001).
48
AIR Patna 170 (1962) (Ind.).
46
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Disputes Act, 194749 and would not be entertained.50
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Rohtas Industries case is
extremely important because it cautions the judiciary against exactly the
same attitude that was adopted in the case of Jay Engineering. Justice Iyer
notes that the conditions under which the English trade union law has
developed were completely different from those of India which was one
“replete with organised boycotts and mass sathyagrahas.”51Therefore, to
transplant torts developed in England to India was wrong unless they were
adapted to Indian law. The decision of the High Court of Calcutta had held
that the doctrines against immunity as applicable in India were the same as
those of England. What is indeed more surprising is that it had based its
reasoning on a controversial decision which had been effectively overruled
by legislative action! With the decision of the Supreme Court in the Rohtas
Industries case, some semblance of order has been restored on this point of
law.
The question also arises as to what remedies are made unavailable due to
the operation of Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act apart from the stated
civil suits. An employer can sue for permanent injunction against a strike
by the workmen and for fulfilment of their contractual obligations. This
possible remedy was excluded by the decision in the case of Federation of
Western India Cine Employees v. Filmalaya Pvt. Ltd.52 In the case, the
federation of trade unions had instructed the workers not to report for work
at the studios concerned with the effect that the business of the
establishment came to a standstill. The Civil Court granted an injunction
against continuation of the strike holding that the dispute was not a “trade
dispute” under the Act. The High Court held that a blanket injunction could
not be issued. However, the Court held that the protection was only for
peaceful and lawful activities and any violence or threats to that effect
would not be protected.
In the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Bank v.
Federation of Indian Bank Employees’ Union,53 the Bank sought an
injunction to restrain the federation from holding meetings and
demonstrations within a radius of fifty metres from the bank offices and
branches. The Court refused such a remedy stating that it would amount to
curtailing the legitimate acts and rights of the trade unions and no
injunction could be issued. However, the immunity would not be available
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in respect of acts which were unlawful. If a prima facie case is made out
that unlawful activities are being conducted by the trade union then the suit
would be maintainable and the issue of the actual commission of such acts
would be decided during the course of the suit.54
It has been argued that as a whole, the Trade Unions Act, 1926 needs an
overhaul to better implement the constitutional mandate of ushering in
economic, social and political justice. It is said that the legislation that is in
force in India was framed at a time and by a Government which did not
share the same ideals of social justice that have been enshrined in the
Constitution since. It is also submitted that England herself has moved
much ahead in the recognition of trade unions’ rights while the Indian law
has stagnated at the point that it had been enacted originally.55

CONCLUSION
The evolution of the immunity of trade unions and their members
reflects on the tussle between the legislative intent of according trade union
activity freedom and the laissez faire induced ideology of the judges which
was unfavourable to any such concessions.56 The extension of forms of
tortious liability to trade unions and their activity was a manifestation of
exactly this dichotomy. The development in this law has led to a
multiplicity of legislation and conflicting judicial opinion as well.
The Indian legislation of 1926 has crystallised some of the immunity that
had been present in English law due to the Act of 1906. However, there has
been considerable development of the law in the latter jurisdiction with the
result that there are better safeguards for trade union activity in England as
compared to India where the law has been frozen after the enactment. The
case law development in India with regard to the protection granted has
also not developed the law greatly as it has done in the United Kingdom.
The development in the case of Jay Engineering actually pushed back the
immunity granted to a lesser level by adopting the Rookesratio.
It is necessary that there should be some normative conclusions about the
nature of the immunity that a trade union requires. In the opinion of the
54
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researcher, the widest amplitude must be given to the interpretation of the
immunity. The position after the enactment of the Trade Disputes Act,
1965 should be favoured. The right of the trade unions to threaten to resort
to collective agitation mechanisms such as strikes must be recognised as
has been done in the United Kingdom. The decision in cases such as Jay
Engineering must be very cautiously applied. The judges, in that case, had
applied actions resulting in tortious liability as outside the scope of the
immunity granted to trade unions. These positions have long been
discarded in the land of their origin where tortious action of molestation
and intimidation are no longer exceptions to trade union immunity. In order
to clarify the position, legislative action is the need of the day, whereby
specific provisions can be added to the same effect.

